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Abstract 
Quantitative social science (QSS) has the potential to make an important contribution to 
public policy. However it also has a number of limitations, many of which are unknown or 
poorly understood by those not familiar with quantitative methodology. The aim of this paper 
is to explain these limitations to a non-specialist audience and to identify a number of ways in 
which QSS research could be improved to better inform public policy.  
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Policymakers make extensive use of quantitative evidence to inform and justify policy 
decisions. However, there are a number of issues in how this evidence is produced and used 
by such groups. In this paper we focus specifically on the ‘supply side’ of how quantitative 
social science (QSS) evidence is created, and the most pressing challenges associated with 
this process.  
Many of the issues we consider have been extensively discussed within various disciplines 
(e.g. Ioannidis 2006; Dirnagel and Lauritzen 2010; Franco et al 2014). However, by bringing 
these together, we hope to illustrate how they combine to potentially harm the policy making 
process. In doing so, we hope to inspire a change in QSS research practice, and to encourage 
policymakers (and the public) to engage more thoroughly and critically with QSS evidence.   
Introduction 
QSS has a major role in the policy-making process worldwide (see Johnson and Antill [2011] 
and Parsons et al [2014] for recent examples from the UK). High impact studies receive 
significant media coverage, with academic evidence used to identify important social issues 
and inform appropriate policy responses (see examples below). There are many reasons why 
policymakers might be particularly drawn to quantitative evidence. First, numerical findings 
and statistics may seem more certain and ‘scientific’ than qualitative observations and 
interviews. Indeed, Allen and Preiss (1997)1 note that people find messages supported by 
quantitative evidence more persuasive than narrative arguments alone, while journalists judge 
quantitative studies to be more accurate and newsworthy than qualitative research 
(Schmierbach 2005). A further attraction is that QSS often simplifies complex social 
problems into a single set of numbers. Some suggest this may explain the prevalence of 
international performance indicators (Kelley and Simmons 2015), such as the widely cited 
                                                          
1 However, as Brownson et al (2009) note, the combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence has a more 
persuasive impact than either type of evidence alone. 
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Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) rankings of children’s educational 
attainment, which are widely cited by policymakers across the globe.  
To the authors’ knowledge, no research has investigated the effect of these attitudes on 
policymakers’ use of QSS. However, even a cursory examination of UK parliamentary 
debates yields several examples of policymakers treating QSS evidence as an independent 
body of neat, certain facts. The following quote illustrates this practice clearly: 
‘Evidence shows that cohabiting parents are four times more likely to have separated 
by the time their child is three years of age, and by their child’s fifth birthday, more 
than one in four of those who cohabit have split up. For married parents, however, 
the break-up rate is fewer than one in 10…It is not any form of prejudice; it is the 
evidence behind the Government’s wish to recognise marriage in the tax system’. 
(House of Commons Debate, 21 October 2014, c194WH) 
Yet this does not reflect the reality of QSS research. The social world is incredibly complex 
and dynamic, and evidence, even on quite basic social questions, is rarely black and white. 
Instead it is often provisional, qualified, and uncertain.  
In the following sections, we discuss four limitations of the QSS evidence base, and suggest 
ways these could be addressed to make academic QSS a more effective resource for 
policymakers. We also briefly discuss difficulties at the QSS evidence-policymaking 
interface via a specific case study. Many of the topics covered are likely to have relevance for 
other disciplines (e.g. epidemiology, genetics) and alternative approaches (e.g. qualitative 
social science). However, as our expertise is in QSS, this is our point of focus. 
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Transparency and verifiability 
Policymakers often deploy QSS evidence by citing figures from academic papers. As already 
noted, these figures are commonly treated as exact, concrete, and final. Yet such estimates are 
often the result of a long and complex process, with many assumptions and caveats 
embedded in the analysis.   
To begin, the data must be downloaded and the various files merged together. This dataset 
must then be ‘cleaned’, before key variables are recoded into the desired format. Any 
difficulties with the data should be documented and investigated, including missing 
information and possible errors in measurement. Descriptive statistics should then be 
produced before any ‘modelling’ takes place (however, often it is only this last step that is 
reported in detail in QSS papers).  
It is vital that the steps outlined above are carried out correctly; mistakes (e.g. miscalculating 
new variables) are easy to make, and can lead to serious difficulties in the modelling that 
follows. Leaving aside true errors, there are also many judgement calls which can have a 
dramatic effect on the results. To take a concrete example, the effects of income inequality 
have been a topic of recent political discussion. However, ‘income inequality’ can be 
measured in different ways2. This includes choice of index (e.g. Gini coefficient), income 
concept (e.g. gross or net), and unit of analysis (e.g. household versus individual). These 
choices can dramatically change how countries compare in terms of inequality (Solt 2009), 
and therefore inequality’s apparent association with important social outcomes.  
For policymakers to have confidence in the analysis process, transparency is vital.  It should 
be easy for independent researchers to verify how figures have been produced, and whether 
small adjustments in methodology (e.g. using one inequality measure in place of another) has 
                                                          
2 This is also an area where errors have been found in QSS work, undermining the credibility (and the general 
public’s trust) in results (see Giles 2014). 
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any effect on results. Just as schoolchildren must show workings in their mathematics 
homework, one might presume academics are required to show how they produce their 
figures. However, this is not the case. For results to be truly independently verifiable, at least 
two conditions must hold: 
(i) The data must be publicly available and free to download. 
(ii) The exact analysis steps must be publicly available. 
Unfortunately most QSS research falls down on at least one of these counts. Although the 
ESRC has made substantial progress in making data publicly available, many important 
resources remain locked behind large fees3 or restrictive access agreements (e.g. the Twins 
Early Development Study, TEDS, and data produced by the Universities and Colleges 
Admissions Services, UCAS). 
Even where data are freely and publicly available, the goal of true independent verifiability 
remains out of reach. This is due to academics’ ‘program code’ not being freely available. 
‘Program code’ refers to computer instructions which, when applied to the data, produce the 
final reported figures. These instructions can run to thousands of lines, with each potentially 
containing a choice (or mistake) influencing the results. The methods section of an academic 
paper cannot plausibly cover all of these instructions in detail. It is therefore commonplace to 
reduce this code to a few general sentences. As Anderson et al (2005:101) note ‘an applied 
article is only the advertising for the data and code that produced the published results.’ In 
other words, for most QSS, only the paper (the ‘advertisement’) is available and forms part of 
the evidence base. The actual substantive research (i.e. the analysis steps and program code) 
is not. 
                                                          
3 Datasets like the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) can cost thousands of pounds 
(see ALSPAC 2013:3). This is a clear barrier to researchers wishing to replicate findings based on this dataset.  
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McCullough, McGeary and Harrison (2008) highlight the importance of this issue. A few 
journals have previously asked authors to share their data and code, including the journal 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. McCullough et al (2008:1416) attempted to 
reproduce results from 117 studies using this resource. They concluded that ‘when all was 
said and done, we were able to replicate only 9 of the 117 articles.’ Similarly, McCullough, 
McGeary and Harrison (2006) found that only 62 out of 186 studies published in the Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking shared their data and code (even though all authors were 
required to do so). Moreover, of these 62 studies, only 14 were actually replicable. The work 
of King (2003), Ray and Valeriano (2003), Boyer (2003) and Neuliep (1991) suggest that this 
is a serious issue across the quantitative social sciences. 
The relevance for public policy can be illustrated with a recent example. A working paper 
published by two Professors (one at Harvard University) suggested a country’s economic 
growth begins to suffer as national debt reaches 90 percent of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2010). On the basis of this finding, a policymaker might decide to introduce public spending 
cuts to avoid this ‘debt cliff’. Indeed, senior policymakers in the US and Europe (e.g. UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne) cited this research to support austerity 
programmes (Arthur and Inman 2013). However, as with most QSS research, the workings 
and program code behind this analysis were not published alongside the paper  
The danger of program code remaining unpublished is that mistakes can happen (they are a 
fact of life). And a mistake did happen in this case. After failing to replicate Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s results, a PhD student contacted the Professors asking for their data and program 
code (which, to their credit, they provided – something they were under no obligation to do). 
The student found a typo meaning that 5 of the 20 countries had accidently been excluded 
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from the analysis which, along with some other anomalies, made a substantial difference to 
the results4.  
One might argue this illustrates that the current system works. An error was made, but it was 
subsequently caught by another researcher, with the evidence base ultimately self-correcting. 
To this we argue it was only the openness of these researchers in sharing their calculations 
that allowed this error to become known. Had they been unwilling or (more likely) too busy 
to respond, this would have remained undetected, permanently distorting the evidence base. 
This is a significant issue given that authors may not share their raw calculations, even when 
this is required by journals (see our discussion of McCullough et al [2006] above).  
In QSS, as in any other field, mistakes happen. The only way to limit their impact is to 
require QSS research to be independently verifiable. It is only the ‘many eyes’ of other 
researchers that will help prevent unreliable evidence causing social harm. The simplest 
solution is for data and code to be made openly accessible whenever this is legally possible. 
This requires action from a central organisation with leverage over researchers and 
publishers. For example, the ESRC could make publication of program code (where possible) 
a pre-condition of funding. 
Failure to communicate uncertainty 
Policymakers often employ QSS evidence as if it provides clear, unambiguous facts about the 
social world. For example, evidence from QSS has been used by UK politicians to assert with 
certainty that English children’s numeracy skills have declined relative to other countries 
(Jerrim 2013); and that low ability rich children overtake high ability poor children in 
education by age 10 (Jerrim and  Vignoles 2013). Unfortunately, QSS findings are usually 
subject to much more uncertainty than seems to be commonly understood by policymakers. 
                                                          
4 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22223190. 
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Of course, a certain level of uncertainty is inevitable in any research field. What is vital is 
that this be clearly communicated to readers. Whilst many researchers do highlight a range of 
uncertainties (e.g. unrepresentative samples, missing data) this is not always the case. Indeed, 
often one type of uncertainty (sampling variation) takes precedence over others (Gorard 
2010)5. This form of uncertainty means researchers could observe a finding by ‘chance’, due 
to the fact that they (typically) only have data from a random sample of individuals, rather 
than the whole population. This is well understood in QSS, and quantified within the 
framework of statistical significance testing.  
There is a strong focus on this uncertainty within QSS. Testing for statistical significance is 
taught for several weeks in most statistics courses, and is expected in most QSS publications 
(Gorard 2010). This can, however, obscure other important details of a result (Sterne and 
Davey-Smith 2001). Importantly, a result being ‘statistically significant’ does not mean it is 
policy relevant or important. For example, female maths students may answer 50% of test 
questions correctly, compared to 49.9% for men. With a large enough sample, this difference 
may be ‘statistically significant’, but this does not mean it warrants any kind of policy 
attention.  
In no way does statistical significance rule out other possible uncertainties. Indeed, on many 
occasions unrepresentative samples, missing information, and poorly measured data pose a 
much greater threat to results (e.g. Jerrim 2013). Yet these challenges typically receive less 
attention than significance testing – both within academic papers and the training of students 
(Gorard 2010). 
                                                          
5 An example is meta-analyses, where individual studies are typically weighted by the size of the standard error. 
Hence studies with lower sampling variation get more weight in results. Yet this ignores that these studies could 
be of lower quality (and have more uncertainty) in other dimensions (e.g. missing data and measurement error).  
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Take measurement error as an example. To produce informative results, the variables used in 
any analysis must be well-measured. Findings from poorly measured data can still be 
statistically significant, but this does not mean they are useful. This issue is hugely important 
in QSS, as researchers often rely on whatever data are available on a given issue. For 
example, investigating social mobility in Singapore, Ng (2009) measured the association 
between the incomes of survey respondents and those of their fathers when the respondents 
were children. However, fathers’ income was reported by their children based on their own 
memories. Similarly, Brunello, Weber and Weiss (2012) investigated the link between the 
number of books there were in a person’s home when they were age 10 and their salary in 
later life. The problem being that the information on books was based on 50 – 80 year olds 
recalling their bookshelves more than 40 years on. Strong, policy-relevant conclusions could 
be drawn from these results – that income mobility in Singapore is low, or that the number of 
books at home has a substantial effect on children’s long-run outcomes. However, these 
conclusions would not recognise the great uncertainty arising from the use of weak measures. 
Our argument is not that QSS studies should be perfect; researchers must commonly make-do 
with what data is available. Rather it is that the wide array of uncertainties (including weak 
measures, measurement error, and missing data) should be transparently communicated, 
beyond the focus on statistical significance. To our knowledge, there are no widely used 
guidelines for transparent reporting of QSS results. However, we offer the following as a first 
suggestion towards a ‘gold-standard’:  
 Data and program code should be freely available 
 The paper should contain a table showing the extent and selectivity of missing data 
 There should be a discussion of possible measurement error for each of the key 
variables  
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 A range of sensitivity analyses should be shown in an appendix, including 
adjustments for missing data, investigations of measurement error, different 
operationalization and measurement of key variables, different regression model 
specifications and use of different statistical techniques 
 Key findings should be shown to hold when using an alternative dataset 
In reality, such a standard is likely to be difficult. Finding a second dataset to replicate results 
is often not possible, for example. Nevertheless, it is reasonable for policymakers to expect 
these issues to have been considered in QSS research, with evidence presented on their likely 
impact on results (where feasible). We suggest journals require that papers include a specific 
section providing straightforward answers to each of these issues.  
Publication bias 
Publication bias refers to certain types of result being more likely to be published in academic 
journals than others, for reasons other than scientific merit. This has been extensively studied 
in the medical literature, where it has been observed that ‘positive’ (i.e. statistically 
significant) results are more likely to be published (Easterbrooke et al 1991). There is no 
good scientific reason for this – a study showing no significant effect is often just as 
important as one showing a substantial effect. 
Doctors are increasingly aware that this type of systematic publication bias harms patients 
(Dirnagl and Lauritzen, 2010). If studies showing that a drug is effective are more likely to be 
published than those that do not, then doctors may end up believing the drug to be more 
effective than it really is. They may then be more likely to prescribe the drug for patients, 
despite the totality of the evidence (i.e. from both published and unpublished studies) actually 
being rather mixed.  
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There is potentially a similar issue in public policy. If policymakers are exposed to a distorted 
picture of the scale of a social problem, or of the effectiveness of a particular policy solution, 
this restricts their ability to make informed decisions. While QSS may be less affected by 
commercial pressure than medical research, there are other forms of bias which may distort 
the messages policymakers receive.  
Previous research has identified bias towards ‘positive’ findings as particularly pernicious 
(e.g. Fanelli 2012). This bias can be divided into two components. First, journal editors and 
peer reviewers seem to prefer clear, significant findings to negative or null results (Ioannidis 
and Trikalinos 2005; Young et al 2008). This is clearly demonstrated by Emerson et al 
(2010), who sent two versions of a fabricated manuscript to 238 reviewers. The only 
difference between the versions was that one showed positive results and the other null 
results. Reviewers rated the ‘positive’ manuscript more highly, and were more likely to 
recommend it for publication.  
Franco et al (2014) highlight the second component of publication bias, which intrudes before 
journal submission. They found researchers were 60 percentage points more likely to submit 
strong, significant findings for publication than null findings. This means that tests of many 
hypotheses never enter the academic evidence base. Although there are methods to detect 
publication bias in meta-analyses and systematic reviews (e.g. funnel plots), these have 
limitations. For instance, Lau et al (2006) note that funnel plots can mistake genuine 
differences in effect sizes between small and large studies (due to differences in target 
populations) for publication bias6. 
                                                          
6 Moreover, funnel plots can only identify publication bias due to the chase for ‘statistically significant’ results. 
It cannot detect journals’ preferences for ‘eye-catching’ findings, or researchers’ reduced incentives to write up 
findings with small effect sizes (even if a large sample means it can be labelled statistically significant). 
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This problem may be particularly acute in high-profile journals, which gain their status partly 
from the number of people citing articles they publish. They therefore have a strong incentive 
to carry eye-catching findings. Indeed, Barto and Rillig (2012) find that high profile journals 
are more likely to publish research showing large effects, with null results more likely to be 
published in low-tier journals (Littner et al 2005). This is partly why studies showing positive 
results are more often cited (Barto and Rillig 2012; Jannot et al 2013).  
The lure of an influential article in a ‘top’ journal could also encourage researchers to 
exaggerate or selectively report results. Whilst most researchers are committed to conducting 
and reporting honest research, questionable research practices remain an issue. Concrete 
academic malpractice (e.g. altering or inventing results) is thankfully rare, though a recent 
meta-analysis found that two percent of academics admitted falsifying data (rising to 14 
percent when asked about research practices of colleagues - Fanelli 2009)7. These figures are 
much higher for less extreme forms of poor practice, such as dropping data points based on a 
‘gut feeling’ or selectively reporting results. Fanelli (2009) found 34 percent of researchers 
admitting to such practices, and 70 percent said their colleagues engaged in them. Similarly, a 
meta-analysis by Dwan et al (2008) found selective reporting of positive results even when 
outcomes were pre-specified in a registered protocol. 
The majority of the above studies are drawn from medicine. However, similar processes are 
likely to operate in QSS. In fact, these factors may be even more prevalent, due to the 
reliance of QSS on ‘observational’ data, compared with the greater use of experimental 
methods in medicine (randomised controlled trials – RCTs; Haynes et al (2012).  
RCTs are expensive and time-consuming to conduct (Ho et al 2008). Research teams enter 
the field to recruit participants, administer treatments, define control/intervention groups and 
                                                          
7 This study included academics from any scientific discipline. 
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measure outcomes. These trials are usually pre-registered on a central database, making it 
hard (though not impossible) for there to be no record of an RCT (even if findings don’t 
appear in an academic journal). Moreover, academics running RCTs face significant upfront 
costs –a lengthy ethics process, recruitment of participants, administration of the intervention, 
and management of the trial. Thus, by the time data analysis can begin, academics have 
already invested a lot of time and effort they cannot get back whether results are published or 
not. There are hence still reasonable incentives for academics who have conducted an RCT to 
write up their findings, even when results are small or statistically insignificant8.  
The same is not true for QSS, which makes extensive use of pre-existing data resources, 
normally funded and collected by a central organisation and freely shared for research 
purposes. Consequently, it is easy to test new hypotheses quickly, and to get provisional 
results within a matter of days. This means little is lost if findings are never written up. This 
is a huge potential source of publication bias, which is almost impossible to detect, and 
whose consequences are rarely recognised. 
Added together, these biases have uncomfortable implications for public policy. If 
insignificant, small, or uninteresting findings are rarely written up, the evidence base 
becomes dominated by exciting, surprising, positive findings. Fanelli (2012) found that this 
bias has grown over time, particularly within social science disciplines. Consequently the 
QSS literature is likely to exaggerate (i) the extent and severity of social problems and (ii) the 
extent to which policy interventions can effect change. This has important implications, 
potentially leaving policymakers too active in public policy – investing in ineffective 
solutions to social problems that might not even exist.  
                                                          
8 There are other biases which create difficulties for the medical literature, such as the influence of 
pharmaceutical companies, which do not strongly affect the QSS evidence base 
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Unfortunately, another source of bias amplifies this problem yet further – the mainstream 
media. This is the medium through which QSS findings are often made accessible to non-
academic audiences. Unlike academic journals, the media need not even try to fairly 
represent the evidence base within a given field. They instead concentrate on the most 
striking, controversial, and politically sensitive findings – often focusing on ‘bad news’ or 
‘scare’ stories  (Goldacre 2008). As well as highlighting only the most eye-catching QSS 
findings, the mainstream media also often exaggerate results – e.g. claiming causality from 
purely correlational research (Sumner et al 2014), or generalising findings from a small, 
unrepresentative sample to an entire population  (Pellechia 1997). Worryingly, these 
exaggerations can often be traced back to press-releases issued by universities and academic 
journals to promote a particular paper (Sumner et al 2014)9.  
Of course policymakers are not only exposed to QSS findings through the media. Policy 
development is often collaborative, involving extensive reviews of the evidence, and expert 
advice from independent academics. However, individual, highly publicized QSS studies can 
bypass this process to have an outsized influence on policy discussions. One such example is 
the Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) study described above, and we discuss a further example in 
our case-study below.  
Given the strong effect of the media, it is unrealistic to expect policymakers to have a 
completely unbiased picture of the quantitative evidence on a given topic. However, some 
practical steps could be taken by the QSS community, and by academic publishers, to reduce 
the biases outlined above: 
1. Extending open publishing models, such as that adopted by PLOS One, across all 
QSS journals. Rather than allowing editors and peer-reviewers to make judgments 
                                                          
9 This research was conducted in health sciences – however it is likely to also apply to QSS research. 
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based on interest and relevance, PLOS One publishes all studies deemed 
methodologically sound. At a stroke, this reduces journals’ incentives to publish only 
‘exciting’ results, and the incentive for researchers to fail to publish small, 
uninteresting, or insignificant findings. 
2. A requirement that research projects be pre-registered in a central location before data 
access is provided, along with publication of research protocols before projects begin 
(as per best practice in the RCT literature). Journals such as the Journal of Work, 
Ageing, and Retirement (which publishes QSS research), are moving in this direction 
through ‘Registered Reports’. This means studies are pre-registered for publication 
(based on peer-review of their protocols) prior to data analysis taking place – 
preventing them from going ‘missing in action’ based on their results. 
3. Increase the accountability and transparency associated with academic press-releases. 
For instance, Goldacre (2014) recommends that all releases have named authors, 
including both the press-officers and the academics, and should contain direct links to 
the academic paper. 
Peer review does not guarantee research quality 
At the heart of quality assurance in academia is the publication of articles in peer-reviewed 
journals. It is through such publications that academic QSS receives its ‘quality’ stamp, 
illustrating the work has been scrutinized and accepted by other experts in the field.  
There seems to be a strong belief amongst policymakers and the public that academic 
research has a strong quality assurance process, with papers published in peer-reviewed 
journals representing a high standard of work. A search of UK parliamentary debates yields a 
large number of appeals to the fact that research has been ‘peer-reviewed’ as an indicator of 
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its quality. For instance, Caroline Lucas MP implicitly used the fact a particular study had 
been ‘peer-reviewed’ to try to dismiss a key government claim: 
‘Will the Minister explain why the Government’s leaflet on“TTIP myths” claims that a 
family of four would benefit by £400 a year yet makes no mention of the peer-
reviewed paper from Tufts university that predicts that over 10 years the average 
working Briton will be more than £3,000 worse off as a result of the lower wages that 
TTIP will fuel’ (House of Commons Debate, 15 January 2015, c) 
Indeed, even in the midst of the panic surrounding the H1N1 pandemic in Canada, senior 
academics emphasised the need for vaccine research to have the ‘imprimatur of a high impact 
peer review journal’ before it could be considered in public policy (PLoS Medicine editors 
2010).  
In reality, peer-review is far from a fool-proof system. The typical process is for journal 
editors to send a manuscript out to (usually) two academic experts, who provide comments 
and either recommend it for publication, reject the paper, or suggest resubmission after 
revisions. If you have your paper rejected, you move on to another journal, where this process 
begins again. In theory, every new peer review phase should improve the rigour of the paper, 
until it is both methodologically sound and relevant to the readership of the journal.  
Appreciating the limitations of this process has important implications for the use of QSS in 
public policy. First, acceptance for publication is heavily dependent on the opinion of 
reviewers. Ideally, this should be based on objective criteria, resulting in a high level of 
consistency. However, this has been described as a ‘fantasy’ by a former editor of the British 
Medical Journal (Smith, 2006), who noted that ‘inevitably, people will take different views 
on [a paper’s] strengths, weaknesses, and importance’. This means that publication at any 
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particular journal depends on who judges the paper (and thus involves a certain amount of 
luck). Indeed, meta-analyses of peer review have shown extremely low levels of agreement 
between reviewers (Bornmann et al 2002), supporting Smith’s (2006) assertion that much of 
peer review was ‘little better than tossing a coin’. Moreover, while Rothwell and Martyn 
(2000) suggest that standardised review forms may improve consistency, our experience is 
that few QSS journals apply this practice consistently. This can mean that the label ‘peer-
reviewed’ does not indicate that a paper has met an absolute standard of quality. Instead it 
may simply mean that, among the many editors and reviewers who have seen the paper, at 
least someone deemed it worthy of publication. The limitations of peer review are strongly 
highlighted by Gans and Shepherd (1994) who contacted a number of leading economists 
about their experience of publication. They found that several Nobel Prize winning papers 
were initially rejected by journals due to negative reviews - illustrating how even very good 
ideas can be dismissed.  
A further wrinkle is added by the fact that, due to the glacial pace of the journal review 
process (it often takes a year for papers to be accepted after initial submission), many 
academics now produce ‘working papers’ (e.g. Ammermueller 2006). These are preliminary 
versions that authors release into the public domain before the academic review process has 
begun. As such, most working papers have been through a weaker form of peer review (an 
internal department review) at best. Nevertheless, they are often cited by policymakers (e.g. 
the Reinhart and Rogoff paper described above). 
Of course, there are other potential ways to identify a high quality study, such as publication 
in a prestigious journal. However, as previously discussed, high status journals may be 
particularly prone to publication bias (Franco et al 2014). Indeed, there are many examples of 
high-profile, but low-quality studies published in highly respected journals (e.g. the widely 
discredited study of the MMR vaccine by Wakefield et al [1998] was published in the 
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Lancet). Put simply, it is very difficult to know what represents a ‘good journal’ where one 
could expect to find high quality research. Many academics may have some notion of what 
the ‘good’ journals are within their own field. However, this hierarchy is probably unknown 
to individuals working outside academia (or, indeed, outside the specific academic 
discipline).  
To summarise, the quality assurance procedure employed in academia is considerably looser 
than seems to be assumed by policymakers and the public. Indeed, perhaps the most damning 
indictment comes from Gans and Shepherd (1994:179) who, after sharing correspondence 
with 15 Nobel Prize winning economists, stated:  
‘the outpouring of irritation and anger at the publication process that our project provoked—
by the famous economists whom the process has benefitted most—creates concern about 
whether the process functions adequately.’ 
 
As with publication bias, there may be no satisfactory resolution to all the limitations of peer-
review. Any system which could effectively weed out all low quality research would likely 
be punitively expensive and time-consuming. Consequently, some have suggested a stronger 
role for quality assurance activities after publication – ‘post-publication peer review’ (Hunter 
2012). The rise of open access electronic publication allows for a type of crowd-sourced peer 
review – the ‘many eyes’ of other academics evaluating research and judging its quality. 
Currently, only very limited metrics are collected on a given article (e.g. number of citations) 
and these are, at best, weak measures of research quality (Seglen 1997; PLoS Medicine 
Editors 2006). However, internet technology allows for much more than this, from reader 
comments and direct evaluations, to deeper analysis of the nature of citations. The value of 
these systems would be enhanced by the publication of program code (as recommended 
above) alongside academic articles – allowing readers to easily replicate studies, and feed 
results back into the evidence base. There would undoubtedly be difficulties with this 
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framework. However, unlike the present system, it would allow readers to have a ready gauge 
of the academic response to a particular study – whether it has been widely replicated and 
accepted, or whether other academics have concerns. 
Policymakers’ use of QSS evidence 
The primary purpose of this paper is to highlight the most pressing challenges faced by QSS 
as a policy-making resource. However, these challenges are often compounded by how 
policymakers deploy this evidence. Here we describe a case-study involving a problematic 
use of QSS evidence. We also suggest ways research practice could be improved to address 
the issues we discuss.  
Our case study is based upon Feinstein (2003). A single graph from this paper, suggesting 
poor children who performed well on developmental tasks at 22 months were ‘overtaken’ by 
age 10 by rich children who did poorly on the same tasks, has had significant policy impact. 
Former UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg used this to suggest: 
‘By the age of five, bright children from poorer backgrounds have been overtaken by less 
bright children from richer ones—and from this point on, the gaps tend to widen still further’ 
While former Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove stated: 
‘rich thick kids do better than poor clever children when they arrive at school’ 
David Halpern (former chief analyst at the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit) even more 
tangibly illustrates how a single graph from this study managed to bypass the ideal system of 
evidence review: 
‘one of the Ministers present tore out one of the Strategy Unit’s slides and – leaning forward 
to put it in front of the Prime Minister declared – ‘...but what are we going to do about this?’ 
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The slide … showed how the cognitive ability of bright children from poor backgrounds 
appeared to be overtaken by that of much less able children from affluent backgrounds ... 
Within a year more than £500m was assigned to build a programme of pre-school provision 
for the UK.’ [Institute of Education 2010]. 
These statements were made despite Feinstein placing important caveats on the results; the 
sample selected was unusual (and not nationally representative), there were challenges with 
missing data, and the number of observations was small (just 36 children in the high scoring 
poor group). The data also came from the 1970s, and so was of limited relevance to 
contemporary public policy.  
Moreover, a replication study was conducted by Jerrim and Vignoles (2013) (available as a 
working paper in 2011). They discussed a further limitation of the evidence, focusing on 
measurement error in children’s test scores and ‘regression to the mean.’ The authors 
highlight how such statistical issues could be driving the graph that became so highly cited by 
public policymakers. The author of the original study himself recently stated that his paper10: 
‘never says anything about bright or dim kids. Nor there being a specific age of some type of 
formal crossover. I certainly have never said it.’ 
This marks a clear example where the transfer of QSS evidence to policy has not worked as 
one might hope. Drawing on the themes outlined in previous sections, what can we learn 
from the experience of this work? 
First, transparency and independent verification are vital. The study by Jerrim and Vignoles, 
which corrected policymakers’ interpretation of the evidence, was only possible due to open 
and free data access, and the methodological details provided in the original study. (Open 
access to the original program code would have made this easier. But, on this occasion, 
                                                          
10 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2015/01/21/misunderstanding-data-feinstein/ 
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replication was possible due to the simplicity of the methods used, and the rigor of their 
description in the original paper). It hence demonstrates that anything which helps improve 
the replicability, transparency and independent verification of academic studies (e.g. open 
access data and code) can only benefit the evidence-policy interface. 
Second, it illustrates the importance of recognising all forms of uncertainty, and doing 
everything possible to ensure policymakers cannot misinterpret results. The difficulties with 
this evidence could not be revealed by statistical significance testing alone, which is why 
Feinstein (2003) placed a number of other important caveats on his results. This, however, 
did not stop his work being misused, possibly due to findings being presented as a graph. 
Graphs are very effective communication tools – but they often do not capture many of the 
uncertainties present in QSS research. Not only do all forms of uncertainty need to be 
recognised in a study, but they also must be clearly articulated in the presentation of results.  
Third, it illustrates how the peer-review process can operate sub-optimally, and does not rule 
out certain limitations with the evidence going unnoticed. Indeed, we believe this to be a 
good example of where ‘post-publication’ peer review could have led to an earlier warning of 
potential difficulties. 
Finally, despite growing use of systematic reviews and meta-analyses, this case study 
highlights how findings from single, small-scale studies can still have outsized influence on 
public policy. This makes the limitations outlined above even more pressing. We cannot rely 
on policymakers to employ a systematic approach to the evidence on any given topic. 
Therefore problems with any individual paper may not necessarily be ‘washed-out’ by 
subsequent research.  
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The folly of taking such a one-dimensional approach to QSS evidence was recognised by 
David Willetts (former Minister of State for Universities and Science) who stated11: 
‘Sometimes over-reliance on one specific piece of evidence can leave you vulnerable. I 
remember being influenced by Leon Feinstein’s very interesting paper…..I served on Nick 
Clegg’s social mobility group and recommended this powerful evidence to him and he too 
was impressed and cited it. But Leon’s work was challenged by other academics because it 
was affected by reversion to the mean. The result was that the Guardian ran a piece that the 
Coalition’s social mobility strategy was undermined because the research on which it rested 
had been disproved. That is not, of course, a reason for giving up on evidence-based policy: 
but it is a reminder of how careful we have to be in using it.’ 
This point is key. Despite the limitations of QSS, we should not abandon an evidence-based 
approach to policy-making. Rather, both academics and policymakers need to engage more 
critically with the information that QSS provides, and to work out how the quality of 
evidence used in policy-making can be improved. 
Conclusions 
QSS has the potential to make a significant contribution to public policy. Ideally, QSS 
research should: 
 Be independently verifiable 
 Clearly communicate the uncertainty associated with any given result 
 Be free from publication and media bias  
 Be subject to a clear, consistent, and transparent quality assurance process 
                                                          
11 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2015/01/12/the-messiness-inherent-to-policymaking/ 
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In this ideal world, the QSS evidence base would be one of the most powerful tools available 
to policymakers. Unfortunately, as we have shown in this paper, this is not the world in 
which we currently live. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect all the above ambitions to be 
achieved in the near future. However, two practical steps in particular could easily be taken 
by QSS researchers and funders to make a dramatic positive difference.  
First, the ESRC and other research funders should insist that QSS research be independently 
verifiable – including mandatory sharing (where possible) of all data and program code. This 
is a quick, cheap and easy policy to implement – yet one that has the potential to increase the 
quality and transparency of academic QSS research immensely. 
Second, QSS research reports should be required to go much further in explaining the 
uncertainty surrounding their results – beyond the current fixation with statistical 
significance. In the RCT literature, standardised reporting (CONSORT – Schulz et al 2010) 
and methodological quality (the Jadad scale – Jadad et al 1996) scales have been developed 
for such purposes, with other academic disciplines following suit (e.g. the ongoing 
development of the Newcastle-Ottawa scale in epidemiology – see Wells et al 2013). Such 
standardised frameworks are a powerful tool for communicating the strengths and 
weaknesses of quantitative research. Funding should therefore be made available to enable 
the development of similar scales for QSS. Similarly, clear quality appraisal criteria should 
also be developed to assist the QSS peer-review process, offering standardised guidelines to 
be applied across journals. 
These recommendations cannot overcome all the limitations discussed in this paper. Indeed, 
some of the challenges highlighted, such as media bias and arbitrary peer review, will likely 
be difficult to solve. However, this does not mean that these challenges should be ignored. 
Indeed, for QSS research to progress, they must be openly acknowledged and discussed. QSS 
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can make an important contribution to public policy. But more consideration needs to be 
given to the limitations of what can be achieved, what expectations of QSS are realistic, and 
how the QSS community can do their utmost to ensure these expectations are met. This paper 
has tried to illuminate these challenges for non-specialist audiences, and has hopefully 
offered some practical solutions. Nevertheless, further work is needed to ensure that 
academic QSS produces the maximum possible benefit for the general public who, after all, 
pay for the vast majority of our research.  
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